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Abstract—A series of challenges that face effective standardis-
ation of cryptographic techniques are discussed. In many cases
these challenges are illustrated with case studies, primarily
focussing on experience within ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 2, the
international standards committee responsible for developing
standards for cryptographic methods. Priorities for improving
the effectiveness of the standards-making process are also
highlighted.
1. Introduction
There is no doubt that standards have an important
part to play in implementing and managing security.
Within the field of cryptography, a vital technology
for implementing security, standards have played a
leading role in developments for around 40 years,
i.e. since the dawn of its widespread commercial
use. A detailed discussion of cryptographic stan-
dardisation up to 2005 can be found in Dent and
Mitchell, [1].
However, as we discuss in this paper, there are
many challenges to ensuring that cryptographic
standards are as effective as they should be. De-
scribing the nature of these challenges forms the
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main content of this paper. In many cases examples
are given from recent standards development work.
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. A brief and rather selective history of cryp-
tographic standardisation is given in section 2. This
is followed in section 3 by the main content of the
paper, namely a review of some of the most serious
challenges that face the standardisation process. The
paper concludes with a number of remarks relevant
to the future of standardisation 4.
2. Cryptographic standardisation
Standards have played a major role in crypto-
graphic developments for over 40 years. In the
1970s, the US National Bureau of Standards (NBS),
which later became the National Institute for Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST), requested proposals
for a block cipher to become a US federal standard.
This was implicit recognition that cryptography was
becoming a vital technology for more than just
the military and government classified applications.
IBM made a proposal which, after modifications
proposed by the NSA, in 1977 became the hugely
important and influential DES algorithm [2]. DES,
whilst now insecure in single key mode, remains in
widespread use in multiple key mode.
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Shortly after DES became a US federal standard,
a number of parallel standards were published show-
ing how to use the DES algorithm. Most important
these included:
• methods for encrypting data to protect its con-
fidentiality, i.e. the modes of operation, [3];
• techniques for generating a Message Authenti-
cation Code (MAC), a type of checksum or tag
appended to data which guarantees its integrity
and origin [4], [5].
DES was initial standardised only for US federal
government use. However, DES soon became a US
national standard (published by ANSI), [6], and a
de facto international standard for the protection of
banking communications. Modes of operation and
MAC standards were similarly published by ANSI,
[7], [8], and also internationally by ISO/IEC [9],
[10], [11].
On the international stage, in the early 1980s a
committee was established specifically to address
security standardisation: ISO/TC 97 (Information
technology) established SC 20, dealing with cryp-
tography. One of its earliest projects was to stan-
dardise DES, but, as discussed below, this failed.
However, other work succeeded. When, at the be-
ginning of the 1990s, ISO/TC 97 was merged with
its parallel IEC committee to become ISO/IEC JTC
1, SC 20 was reformed and expanded in scope to
become SC 27, dealing with all aspects of Informa-
tion security (including cryptography). Today, SC
271, has five working groups (WGs), of which one,
WG 2, is responsible for cryptography standards.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, efforts in
the late 1980s to produce an international standard
for DES failed. In fact, the ISO DES standard
was almost published, but was blocked for political
reasons at the very last moment. Encryption (but not
1. See http://www.din.de/en/meta/jtc1sc27
MACs and other cryptographic methods) was still
a technology some governments wished to control.
For this reason it was decided at the time that SC 27
was formed that its scope would explicitly exclude
standardising encryption algorithms. This did not
prevent the development of a range of standards
covering a range of other techniques, and, in the
early 2000s, the decision to exclude encryption
was overturned. Today, a wide range of encryption
algorithms are the subject of international standards
(see, for example, ISO/IEC 18033, [12], [13], [14],
[15]).
Indeed, SC 27/WG 2 has published, and continues
to maintain, a wide range of standards for crypto-
graphic techniques, including:
• encryption algorithms (including asymmetric
schemes (ISO/IEC 18033-2, [13]), block ci-
phers (ISO/IEC 18033-3, [16]) and stream ci-
phers (ISO/IEC 18033-4, [15]));
• modes of operation for block ciphers (ISO/IEC
10116, [17]);
• MAC techniques (ISO/IEC 9797 parts 1–3,
[18], [19], [20]);
• hash functions (ISO/IEC 10118 parts 1–4, [21],
[22], [23], [24]);
• digital signatures (ISO/IEC 9796 parts 2 and 3,
[25], [26] and ISO/IEC 14888 parts 1–3, [27],
[28], [29]);
• authenticated encryption (ISO/IEC 19772,
[30]);
• authentication and key management protocols
(ISO/IEC 9798 parts 1–6, [31], [32], [33], [34],
[35], [36], and ISO/IEC 11770 parts 1–4, [37],
[38], [39], [40]);
• random bit and random prime generation
(ISO/IEC 18031, [41], and 18032, [42]);
• lightweight cryptography (ISO/IEC 29192 parts
1–4, [43], [44], [45], [46]); and
• privacy enhancing technologies (ISO/IEC
2
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20008 parts 1 and 2, [47], [48] and ISO/IEC
20009 parts 1 and 2, [49], [50]).
Despite these practical successes, many chal-
lenges remain, as we discuss in the remainder of
this paper.
3. Challenges to standardisation
We now review some of the most serious chal-
lenges that the standardisation process continues to
face.
3.1. Drafting and maintenance
Cryptographic algorithm standards are intended to
specify a range of aspects of a technique, including:
• how to implement an algorithm;
• in what circumstances the algorithm should be
used; and
• how parameters/options for an algorithm should
be chosen.
However, they are not intended to be textbooks
— in particular, they are not concerned with why
particular aspects of a scheme are designed the way
they are. After all, a software developer or protocol
designer does not need to know such information;
if they want to know more they can read a textbook
or take a course on cryptography! Typically a stan-
dard will provide references to books and papers
providing further information on the standardised
techniques.
In the author’s view, standards should be as simple
and as easy to use as possible. Perhaps surprisingly,
this is an area academics writing standards often
really struggle with, as they instinctively want to ex-
plain why, and as a result they risk making standards
unnecessarily long and complex. Indeed, writing an
easy-to-use standard is a highly non-trivial exercise,
and certainly something worth thinking about as an
art in itself.
Perhaps the most serious challenge of all is merely
to do with the fact that published standards need
to be maintained, particularly in a fast-moving area
like cryptography. As the list in the previous section
makes clear, there are many published standards,
and there are a limited number of experts pre-
pared to give up their time for the often rather
unglamorous work of updating and correcting draft
standards.
Legacy, i.e. the need to maintain compatibility
with existing deployed systems, is one of the bug-
bears of security, and this very much holds for stan-
dards development. In some cases SC 27/WG 2 has
had to retain undesirable techniques or options in
standards because they remain in wide use; typically
a retained technique of this type will be one that is
not suitable for general use but remains secure if
used appropriately. Such a technique needs to be
clearly marked as deprecated for new applications.
Of course, there are obvious hazards in leaving such
techniques in standards, but in practice there is little
choice. Of course, if such a technique becomes
completely insecure, then there is no alternative
but to remove it from the standard as speedily as
possible.
One example of such a deprecated technique
arises in ISO/IEC 9797-1, [18], the ISO/IEC stan-
dard for MACs computed using a block cipher in a
variant of Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, so
called CBC-MACs. When computing a CBC-MAC,
the data meeds to be divided into fixed length blocks
— as a result the last block of data often needs
to be ‘padded’. Historically this was done using a
string of all zeros. This technique remains secure
if the message length is known to the recipient by
independent means, e.g. if the message length is
fixed — otherwise it is insecure. Thus this padding
3
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method should only be used with great care and
its use is deprecated. However it is still specified
in the latest edition of ISO/IEC 9797-1 (as padding
method 1 of clause 6.3.2) because of the huge legacy
of applications which employ this technique.
3.2. Revising standards
If a security weakness is found in a standardised
algorithm, protocol or procedure, this needs to be
fixed (to remove the algorithm or amend the advice
on its use). Historically, SC 27/WG 2 has been
receptive to news of problems and reasonably quick
to act. However, acting has typically meant simply
amending the standard. That is, unless a user of
the standard regularly checks the ISO website2 they
would have no way of knowing that a change has
occurred. This needs to change, and SC 27/WG 2
has recently developed procedures for informing the
wider community of issues in existing standards as
soon as possible after they have been identified. We
briefly mention two recent examples of where such
changes have needed to be made.
A few years ago, it became clear that almost
all the authentication and key management protocol
standards had a specification problem [51]. Many of
the protocol messages are specified as being made
up of the concatenation of various fields, input to a
crypto-primitive. However, ‘concatenation’ was not
really specified. It could be interpreted to mean sim-
ply taking two bit strings and joining them together
to make a longer bit string. In some cases such an
implementation could give rise to security issues. It
was therefore necessary to amend all the affected
standards (various parts of the ISO/IEC 9798 and
ISO/IEC 11770 series) to make it clear that con-
catenation implied an encoding method which was
uniquely and unambiguously decodable. SC 27/WG
2. See http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html
2 created and published six corrigenda to fix this
problem, all within 12 months.
ISO/IEC 19772, [30] is concerned with authenti-
cated encryption. One of the six mechanisms in this
standard is ‘generic encrypt-then-MAC’, i.e. allow-
ing authenticated encryption to be instantiated by
encryption then MAC computation using arbitrary
(secure) algorithms. It was recently pointed out by
Namprempre, Rogaway and Shrimpton, [52] that the
standard as specified is insecure, since it did not
mandate the inclusion of the Initialisation Vector
used for the encryption process within the scope
of the MAC. A (quite complex) corrigendum was
written and published by WG 2 of SC 27 within 12
months, [53], to address this problem.
3.3. Timing
In some cases SC 27/WG 2 has tried to standard-
ise techniques when there are no suitable candidates.
For example, SC 27/WG 2 started work on ISO/IEC
10118-3 (dedicated hash-functions) before NIST’s
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) was published, when
the only obvious candidates were MD4, [54], and
MD5, [55]. As work started on this new standard in
the early 1990s, it was made clear by participating
experts that MD4 and MD5 were not suitable for
standardisation. Fortunately SHA/SHA-1, [56], was
published just at the right time, and was duly
included in the first edition of ISO/IEC 10118-3,
[57].
However, whilst there are dangers of standardising
too early, there are also dangers of being too late.
SC 27 is only now standardising key derivation
techniques: ISO/IEC 11770-6 is currently out for
FDIS ballot, [58], and should be published in late
2016. As a result there are many slightly different
techniques in use (including in SC 27 standards),
a potential major problem for future implementers
trying to maintain compatibility between systems.
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3.4. Variation
As Tanenbaum famously said: ‘The nice thing
about standards is that there are so many of them
to choose from’, [59]. Cryptography standards have
been, and continue to be, produced by many dif-
ferent bodies, including both national organisations
(e.g. NIST, ANSI, DIN, BSI, etc.), and international
bodies (such as ISO/IEC, IEEE, IETF, ITU-T, and
ETSI). Too often these standards overlap and even
conflict with one another, making life very challeng-
ing for standards users. Arguably even the ISO/IEC
standards contain too many choices; for example,
ISO/IEC 18033-3, [16], contains as many as seven
different block ciphers: four 64-bit ciphers and three
128-bit schemes.
The issue of trying to minimise the set of stan-
dardised techniques has been discussed widely —
see, for example, [60]. An internal standing docu-
ment has been established within SC 27/WG2 to try
to help ensure that only algorithms of genuine value
to users are added to the catalogue of standardised
techniques, [61].
3.5. Adoption
One major practical problem with ISO/IEC stan-
dards is that they are not freely available. Indeed
they are rather expensive to buy. As a result they
are widely ignored. Too often, IETF RFCs, many
of which are not in any sense standards, are treated
as the authoritative source for cryptographic tech-
nology. This is despite the fact that the process for
adopting an ISO/IEC standard is far more rigorous
than that used to decide whether an RFC should be
promulgated.
There are many reasons why ISO/IEC standards
are not always adopted. One is that they cost money,
as discussed before. However, many parties seem
possessed by an irrepressible desire to invent their
own techniques, independently of any already exist-
ing standards. IETF is a prime example — the US
influence is strong, and possibly as a result inter-
national standards are regarded as rather irrelevant.
Perhaps more surprisingly, ETSI, with apparently
good relations with ISO, insists on designing its own
algorithms in its specialist cryptography committee
SAGE3 rather than joining forces with SC 27. His-
torically, the banking community have also tended
to write their own standards.
This diversification of algorithm standards can
have very damaging consequences. As mentioned
before, MD5 (a hash function) was not standardised
by ISO/IEC for sound security reasons. However,
it was published by the IETF in an RFC, [55].
This has led to its very widespread (and continuing)
use, despite the fact it is insecure. Indeed there
are known real-world attacks, notably including the
Flame malware, [62], which have exploited its use.
Although this is not necessarily the fault of the
standards, there are many examples of implementa-
tions which have been found not to follow standards
correctly — see, for example, [63], [64], [65]. This
is perhaps not so much a problem for algorithm
standards, but is certainly an issue for random num-
ber generation (as needed for cryptographic keys).
It may also be a problem for some aspects of key
management and authentication. This seems to be a
cultural issue amongst the developer community. To
try to minimise the chance of this happening, it is
incumbent on developers of standards to make them
as clear and precise as possible, and not burdened
with unnecessary detail.
3.6. Reputation
The recent Snowden revelations, as discussed by
Landau, [66], [67], have damaged the reputation of
3. See https://portal.etsi.org/TBSiteMap/sage
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the cryptography standards bodies. As described be-
low, it seems that a random bit generation algorithm
of dubious security (known as Dual EC DRBG)
were included in national (NIST) and international
(ISO/IEC) standards.
Dual EC DRBG is a random bit generation tech-
nique. Following a parallel NIST standard, it was
included in ISO/IEC 18031, [41], along with a set of
‘recommended parameters’. Only because of Snow-
den did the world suddenly realise that the technique
had originally been designed to allow the scheme to
be broken if the parameters are chosen carefully (but
only by the chooser of the parameters). Moreover,
the ‘recommended parameters’ were of unknown
provenance. As soon as this became known, SC
27/WG 2 issued a press release warning about this
issue, and shortly afterwards a corrigendum was
published, [68], removing Dual EC DRBG from
the standard.
Whilst the offending technique has now been de-
standardised, this potentially damages trust long-
term. Indeed, two lightweight block ciphers, SI-
MON and SPECK, were recently submitted by the
US national body (ANSI) for possible standardisa-
tion by ISO/IEC SC 27/WG 2 as part of its evolving
lightweight cryptography standard, ISO/IEC 29192.
Despite having desirable efficiency properties, and
having been subject to widespread scrutiny, adop-
tion is currently being blocked — mainly because
of suspicion of the US.
3.7. Intellectual property and commercial is-
sues
Some standards bodies prohibit standardisation of
patent-protected schemes. ISO/IEC, however, allows
this, as long as fair and non-discriminatory terms
are agreed by the intellectual property (IP) owner.
Enforcing this relies on the standards committee
learning whether or not algorithms proposed for
standardisation are protected. As a side issue, it
is interesting to note that apparently minor crypto-
related features of the 3G mobile standards which
were patent-protected during the standards-writing
process have meant that ‘late’ entrants to the mobile
phone market (e.g. Apple) have had to make huge
payments to the IP owners.
Many of the experts attending the standards com-
mittees are employees of companies with commer-
cial interests in what is or is not standardised.
As a result, the schemes that are standardised are
sometimes influenced by commercial preferences.
This is perfectly legitimate — if you attend, you
get a say — but it may not always be desirable in
a global sense. Academics can play an important
role in challenging what look like poor decisions,
as they are often unencumbered by commercial
considerations.
As mentioned earlier in this talk, efforts to
make DES an international standard in the 1980s
foundered under US government pressure. However,
triple DES is now part of ISO/IEC 18033-3, [16].
It remains primarily for commercial/legacy reasons
— it is certainly significantly weaker than the key
length would lead a user to expect. However, be-
cause it is in wide use, de-standardising it would
cause major real-world problems. It is interesting to
see what the impact will be of recent work showing
2-key triple DES is even weaker than previously
thought [69].
3.8. Political issues
Just like companies with IP portfolios to exploit,
governments, who often fund standards committee
attendees, may wish to promote technologies which
favour individual nation states. One reason is that if
technologies are standardised then it is acceptable
to list them in requirements specifications under
WTO rules. This can lead to nations trying to get
6
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national standards made international — this can, in
turn, exacerbate the problem of excessive numbers
of standardised algorithms.
4. Concluding remarks
The development of novel cryptographic tech-
niques and their assessment and cryptanalysis is
primarily down to academia, at least for non-
government use. This means academic expertise is
vital to the standardisation process in SC 27/WG 2
and elsewhere. Involvement at the national level typ-
ically costs nothing — national bodies shadowing
the work of SC 27, and making contributions to the
work, exist worldwide. Participation in international
meetings as a national delegate is also possible.
On the relatively rare occasions defects are iden-
tified in standards, SC 27/WG 2 needs to be more
active in promulgating these issues. Historically,
WG 2 simply amended the standard concerned, and
felt this was enough. However, this neglects the
users who may have implemented the standard, and
who are unaware of the changes. Only recently has
SC 27/WG 2 developed procedures to let the wider
world know when issues (such as Dual EC DRBG)
are identified.
Sometimes standards development can take far too
long. However, it is possible to go from start to
finish with an ISO/IEC standard in less than three
years; however, it often takes more like five! Greater
involvement by experts is key to getting the job done
in a timely way, and this includes those editing new
standards.
Many academics are wary of being involved in
standardisation as the payback is not easily defined
— specifically, no publications arise directly and
it is sometimes hard to get research grant funding
to support involvement. However, as someone with
nearly 30 years of involvement in standardisation,
I know there are many potential benefits. Writing
a standard often makes you think about things you
might not otherwise worry about, and this can lead
to new research. Also, standards development can
lead to fruitful interactions with industry experts,
and hence to joint research projects and/or con-
sultancy. Above all else, there is huge intrinsic
satisfaction in making academic work accessible
and usable by the wider world.
Unfortunately, there are many examples of real
world systems and products where it seems that
development engineers and protocol designers have
assumed they know better than cryptographers, and
in particular than writers of standards. For exam-
ple, developers sometimes design their own crypto-
graphic algorithm or ignore vital parts of a security
protocol because the rationale for their inclusion is
not obvious (and hence they are wrongly deemed
unnecessary). One might reasonably wonder what
is it about cryptography that makes a non-expert
assume they know as much as an expert. The answer
is far from clear, but it is a hugely serious problem.
One way of reducing the risk of problems of the
above type is to get as many people as possible in-
volved in the standards process, and to try to ensure
the main messages about standards implementation
are promulgated as widely as possible. To this end,
as a long-term standards contributor, I would like to
appeal to everyone who cares about the correct use
of cryptography to think about getting involved in
crypto standards development. Standards represent
a vitally important bridge between theory and prac-
tice. For those of us from academia, standards are
our chance to communicate in simple terms what
our research results indicate should happen.
Despite all the challenges described above, SC
27 has a pretty good track record — so far! Very
few standardised schemes have needed to be sig-
nificantly modified or removed, despite a standards
7
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portfolio going back 30 years. However, for this to
remain true requires that the cryptographic commu-
nity, in academia and industry, continues to partici-
pate in and contribute to the standards development
and management processes.
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